Multidimensional Signaling and the Rise of Cultural Politics

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1.5 / 10 NBER Information Econ Corp. Political

Authors: Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin

Published: 2026-03-02 · View on NBER · PDF


Abstract

In turbulent times, political labels become increasingly uninformative about politicians true policy preferences or their ability to withstand the influence of special interest groups. We offer a model in which politicians use campaign rhetoric to signal their political preferences in multiple


Analysis

Research Question

Why do politicians increasingly focus campaign rhetoric on cultural rather than economic issues, and how does multidimensional signaling explain this?

Data

Theoretical model; no new empirical dataset but grounded in political economy literature

Identification Strategy

Equilibrium model where politicians signal preferences in multiple dimensions; cultural signals are more precise → overweighted in rhetoric even when economy is more voter-relevant

Main Findings

When cultural dimension signals are more precise (easier to verify), politicians of all types signal more on culture. Unpopular types benefit from cultural conformity because it obscures their economic preferences. This generates a “rise of cultural politics” even when voters care more about the economy.

Limitations

Pure theory; no causal empirical validation; assumes rational Bayesian voters which may not hold


Connection to Current Research

Relevant to Project 2 (political attention + partisan alignment in earnings calls): the model explains why firms/politicians emphasize certain signals over others. For earnings calls, firms may similarly choose to signal partisan alignment on more precise/observable dimensions (e.g., explicit policy mentions) rather than underlying true preferences. The multidimensional signaling framework could motivate why partisan alignment in earnings call text is a meaningful signal — firms are choosing which dimensions to communicate.

TipKey Takeaway

Theoretical motivation for why text-based partisan signals in earnings calls are informative despite noise. Cite as motivation for why firms strategically select what political content to include in earnings calls — analogous to politicians choosing cultural vs. economic signals.